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ACTIVE BARRIER PERFORMANCE PREVENTING METHANE 
EXPLOSION PROPAGATION 
Johannes Jacobus Labuschagne du Plessis
1
 and Helmut Späth
2
 
ABSTRACT: Over the past century, the coal mining industry experienced a large number of explosions 
leading to a considerable loss of life. Research was directed at preventing the accumulation of methane 
through good ventilation practice, eliminating frictional sparking by the use of water, minimising dust 
generation and dispersal, and using stone dust to inert coal dust to prevent it from participating in mine 
explosions. The final line of defence, though, is the use of barriers to prevent a coal dust explosion from 
propagating. However, the design of passive explosion barrier systems has remained unchanged for 
many years. The traditional stone dust and water barriers were originally designed and developed as 
much as 50 years ago. In the 1990s the CSIR of South Africa developed a new type of stone dust 
explosion barrier, which has been implemented in South Africa and Australia. This barrier is considered 
to be better suited to modern-day mining practice. It is based on an array of specially manufactured bags 
holding stone dust and suspended from the mine roof.  
 
Preventing the propagation of methane or coal dust explosions through the use of active 
explosion-suppression systems remains one of the most underutilised explosion controls in 
underground coal mines. As part of the effort to develop better technologies to safeguard mines, the use 
of active barrier systems was investigated at Kloppersbos in South Africa. The system is designed to 
meet the requirements of the European Standard (EN 14591-4:2007) (European Standard, 2007), as 
well as the Mine Safety Standardisation in the Ministry of Coal Industry, Coal Industrial Standard (MT 
694-1997) of the People’s Republic of China.  
 
From the tests conducted, it can be concluded that the HS Suppression System was successful in 
stopping flame propagation for a methane explosion, as well preventing methane explosions from 
progressing into methane and coal dust hybrid explosions when ammonium phosphate powder was 
used as the suppression material. The use of this barrier can provide coal mine management with an 
additional explosion control close to the point of ignition and may find application within longwall faces, 
further protecting mines against the risk of an explosion propagating. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1930s, increased use of mechanised mining machinery exacerbated the risk of frictional 
ignitions in working headings in which the interaction of cutting tools with quartz bands can result in 
incendive sparking capable of igniting methane. In recent times the introduction of powerful coal winning 
machines has further increased the number of frictional ignitions. For example, the mine disaster at 
Glace Bay, Nova Scotia, in 1979 claimed 12 lives. This explosion was attributed to a frictional ignition 
and the 1993 explosion at Middelbult Colliery in South Africa was also found to be the result of friction at 
a continuous miner pick. Many safety measures were researched and developed during the last century. 
Of these, the following have been instrumental in reducing the frequency and severity of explosions: 
 
 The mixing of inert material with coal dust deposits 
 Explosion barriers, both active and passive 
 Knowledge and understanding of explosions and their prevention 
 Development of permitted explosives 
 Flameproofing of electrical apparatus and the use of intrinsically safe electrical circuits 
 Improved ventilation practices  
 Improved devices for the detection of flammable gases. 
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Research conducted by Philips (1995) concluded that in South African mines an explosion starts at the 
working face where methane accumulations may occur during the coal-cutting activities.  Although 
intense research attention has been paid to the development of preventive and protection measures 
against coal mine explosions, disasters still occur.  
 
“Of all the risks inherent in coal mining, the one most feared by coal miners is an explosion. Explosions 
are not the biggest cause of loss of life. On a statistical basis, explosions may be amongst the less 
frequent events in mining causing loss of life but, apart from fires and flooding, there is no other cause 
capable of wiping out the entire workforce below ground at the time.” These words, written by Joseph 
Dickson, an Inspector of Mines in the Lancashire coalfield, United Kingdom, in 1850 remain equally valid 
today. 
 
In this paper a summary of the development and evaluation work done utilising the ExploSpot active 
suppression system against methane gas explosions developing into coal dust explosions will be 
described. 
BACKGROUND 
According to Du Plessis and Späth (2002), the aim of using active suppression systems is to contain the 
methane flame in the immediate vicinity of the ignition. This will prevent a methane explosion from 
developing which, in turn, could be the ignition source of a coal dust explosion. Active suppression 
systems have the following main components: 
 
 Detecting sensor/s 
 Electronic control and self-checking system 
 Dust containers 
 Flow nozzles. 
 
These individual components are combined into systems, which are mounted on continuous heading 
machines. When an ignition occurs, its presence is detected by means of the sensor/s. These sensors 
are normally sensitive to the ultraviolet light range. An electronic signal from the sensor triggers the 
suppression system, creating a barrier of flame-suppressing material and containing the flame in the 
immediate vicinity of initiation. The flame-suppressing material most frequently used is ammonium 
phosphate powder, but gases such as NAF SIII chemical fire extinguishing agent may also be 
considered. 
 
There are two testing facilities for the evaluation of these systems, namely the tunnel at BVS-Derne in 
Bochum, Germany, and the 20 m tunnel at Kloppersbos, South Africa. A number of systems have been 
developed by the Deutsche Montan Technologie (DMT) (Faber, 1990) for roadheaders. These have 
been in underground use since 1989 and are well proven and trusted. A test facility capable of testing 
such systems against a set protocol (Du Plessis, 1998) was built and completed during 1995 at the 
CSIR’s Kloppersbos Research Facility. The facility simulates the various mining configurations 
encountered in bord-and-pillar mines. To date, three systems have undergone successful evaluations. 
The first system was developed for low-seam continuous miners (Du Plessis, 2001) and the second for a 
Dosco 1300H auger-type roadheader (Du Plessis, et al., 1999) capable of excavating a seam height of 
up to 4.5 m. The third system was the ExploSpot system (Du Plessis and Späth, 2001) for medium seam 
conditions and some of the results will be discussed in the paper. 
 
The second system is used in mining conditions where the roof slopes at an angle of 12 degrees and a 
double-pass mining method is employed. For this specific evaluation, the maximum height of the roof 
was 4.5 m. The system was deployed at the HBCM mine in the south of France (Du Plessis and Van 
Dijk, 2001).  
 
Description of system and components 
 
ExploSpot is an intrinsically safe, high-speed flammable gas-ignition detection and suppression system 
capable of creating an extinguishant barrier within 100 milliseconds. 
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The ExploSpot system consists of three main components, namely the control electronics, the 
dual-spectrum sensor units and the discharge assemblies. The control electronics are connected to the 
peripheral sensor units and discharge assemblies, constantly monitoring the connections so that the 
system will always be functional when required. The sensor units are placed to monitor the entire tunnel 
area for any methane ignition or coal dust flame. These units are specially designed to react only to 
certain light wavelengths specific to burning methane and coal dust, thus reducing the risk of a false 
ignition. The discharge assemblies are configured for the particular conditions found within a specific 
mine, the cross-sectional area of the tunnel and the method of coal extraction being applied. They are 
also configured to ensure the correct powder distribution and concentration for the successful 
extinguishing of any explosion or ignition. 
 
The system is designed to meet the requirements of the European Standard (EN 14591-4:2007), as well 
as the Mine Safety Standardisation in the Ministry of Coal Industry, Coal Industrial l Standard of the 
People’s Republic of China (MT 694-1997). It is also designed to comply with the International 
Standards (IEC) to meet the intrinsically safe and flameproof standards: IEC 60079-11:1999 and IEC 
60079-0:2005 for intrinsically safe equipment, and IEC 60079-0:2004 and IEC 60079-1:2004 for 
flameproof equipment. 
 
The severity of an explosion is directly related to the rate of flame propagation (Cashdollar and 




Figure 1 - Typical plot of gas explosion speed versus distance 
 
As such the design of any active barrier system requires rapid and accurate response and distribution of 
flame suppressant material. 
TYPES OF SYSTEM 
Machine-mounted systems 
 
The objective of suppressing methane ignitions within the face area where frictional ignition caused by 
the mining of coal occurs can be achieved by using machine-mounted systems. These systems detect 
the ignition of methane caused by the continuous miner or roadheader picks. They will also detect any 
other ignition sources (e.g. electrical) and will prevent the methane ignition from propagating within the 
face area. Modern continuous miners utilise a combination of systems to prevent a methane gas ignition 
from occurring: the use of flameproof equipment, ventilation of methane gas from the face and around 
the continuous miner (CM), a wet cutter head and active suppression barriers. Figure 2 shows the 




The use of an active barrier system for inbye protection, close to the face area, has the additional 
advantage that it is capable of protecting outbye areas by preventing methane explosions from 
developing into coal dust explosions. Furthermore, it does not require any dynamic pressure build-up for 
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activation as activation is dependent on flame detection. Figure 3 shows a graphical representation of all 
the system components. This includes the complete unpacked system of detectors, controllers, 








Figure 3 - Graphical representation of the active barrier system components Testing facilities 
and Evaluations 
 
10 m test tunnel results 
 
The objective of the test work was to investigate the operational effectiveness of the triggered barrier 
system in stopping the methane/coal-related explosions that can occur during typical auger mining 
operations and to demonstrate its effectiveness to Auger mining of South Africa AMSA, DME and the 
coal mining industry (Moolman, et al., 2006). Tests were conducted in the 10 m explosion test tunnel to 
determine the effectiveness of the triggered barrier system in stopping propagating methane explosions, 
simulating flame exiting from the opening of a production hole. Employees of HS Design Engineering 
undertook the set-up of the suppression system 1.5 m outside the 10 m tunnel, while CSIR employees 
prepared the tunnel for testing. Only ammonium phosphate powder was used as the suppression agent.  
 
The evaluation simulated a typical auger operation set-up as far as practically possible. In order to test 
the system under the most severe conditions, no auger flights were placed in the 10 m tunnel. In the 
auger mining application, the active suppression system can only be mounted on the auger outside the 
production hole, thus far away from the cutter head. As the cutter head is most likely to be the only 
ignition source and the auger hole the only roadway for the ignition to propagate in, it can be expected 
that the explosion would exit the auger hole in due course. This is, however, dependent on the amount 
of fuel and oxygen available and on the amount of confinement achieved by the number of auger flights 
trailing the cutter head. 
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The 10 m test tunnel had previously been erected at the CSIR’s Kloppersbos Research Facility for the 
purpose of testing machine-mounted active suppression systems. This tunnel was used to simulate the 
dimensions of an auger hole, and a full-scale model of the triggered barrier system was constructed 1.5 
m in front of the tunnel opening for test purposes. The Kloppersbos explosion tunnel is 10 m long, with a 
diameter of 2 m. It is raised 700 mm above a cement floor with one side is sealed off by a steel plate. 
During a suppressed explosion, the steel plate acts as an emergency pressure-release mechanism in 
the event of very high pressures building up in the tunnel (see Figure 4 which shows the 10 m test tunnel 
with an explosion-stopping wall built over it). During normal tests, the pressure wave and the flame exit 




Figure 4 - 10 m test tunnel at Kloppersbos 
 
In one test a fuse cap was used to ignite the methane/air mixture. In all the other tests a shielded 
detonator was used to ignite the flammable gas mixture. The fuse cap was initially chosen for use as it 
produced a flame that would not be seen or recognised by the triggering mechanism of the suppression 
system. The detonator was shielded from the triggering system; the reason for using it was to create a 
more violent methane explosion. The chamber containing 23 m
3
 of methane/air mixture was obtained by 
placing a plastic membrane 7 m from the closed end of the tunnel. This amount of methane/air mixture 
will produce enough wind pressure to lift the coal dust into the air, supply sufficient heat to the coal dust 
particles for flame propagation to take place and be sufficient to ensure flame growth up to 5 m beyond 
the tunnel mouth. 
 
For most of the active suppression system tests conducted in the 10 m test tunnel, an explosion mixture 
of 9% methane/air per volume was used. This was done to test the triggered barrier system under 
simulated worst-case scenarios. A small amount of coal dust was placed on racks at the open end of the 
10 m tunnel. The main reason for adding this dust was to change the colour of the methane flame to 
assist in the visual evaluation of the system’s success or failure. The amount of coal dust used did not 
change the characteristics of the explosion. 
 
The measure of success was defined to indicate whether the flame propagation was stopped inside the 
tunnel opening (referred to as "stopped inside"). The results of the methane explosion tests are shown in 
Table 1: 
 
In every test the flame was stopped at the tunnel opening, with no flame visible from the front and 
perpendicular to the tunnel. Each explosion was further captured on camera, and a record of the photos 
and the video material was used to evaluate the success of the flame suppression. 
 
The ExploSpot system registered a methane ignition and opened the extinguishing cylinders within 20 
ms. The suppressing agent sealed off the tunnel opening completely within 30 ms, preventing the flame 
from penetrating the suppressant material. During these tests the suppressing agent was initially 
dispersed at high pressure (stored at 60 MPa in the cylinder) and velocity into the propagating flame 
front. From the tests conducted, it was concluded that the machine-mounted ExploSpot system was 
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Visible flame Comments 
1 7.5% Detonator None 
One cylinder failed, flame stopped 
successfully 
2 9% Detonator None Flame stopped successfully 
3 9% Detonator None Flame stopped successfully 
4 9% Fuse cap None Flame stopped successfully 
5 12% Detonator None Flame stopped successfully 
6 9% Detonator None 
Flame stopped successfully. Small flame 
could be seen at the back of the tunnel. 
 
20 m test tunnel: Facility for testing machine-mounted systems 
 
A 20-m test tunnel was erected at the Kloppersbos Research Facility to suit the double-pass mining 
method associated with the use a continuous miner. The protocol for testing the ExploSpot system was 
developed by a forum including representatives from industry, government and labour organisations. 
The tests were carried in accordance with a protocol developed by the CSIR for such testing (Du 
Plessis, 2001). This protocol drew on experience with a similar protocol which had been accepted by the 
South African Safety in Mines Research Advisory Committee (Du Plessis, et al., 1999) for previous 
tests, as well as a protocol accepted by INERIS of France (Du Plessis, 1998). 
 
The protocol defines acceptance criteria in accordance with which the results of the tests would be either 
accepted or rejected, and the tests themselves either passed or failed (Du Plessis, 2001). The protocol 
stipulates the following acceptance criteria: 
 
 The flame should not propagate along the tunnel in line with the operator’s position – so that the 
operator is not exposed to any direct flame. 
 The temperature increase at the operator’s position should not exceed human tolerance levels 
(in this case 100 
o
C for less than half a second). 
 Both the dynamic and static pressures measured should be within human tolerance limits. 
 There must be no false triggering of the system due to other equipment being used 
underground. 
 The system should be up and running again within eight hours of a detonation. 
 
This tunnel was modified to simulate the dimensions of mine workings of medium seam height, and a 
full-scale model of the Joy 12HM9 continuous miner was used for test purposes. The test tunnel is 20 m 
long and 7 m wide, with a variable height of 2 to 6 m. It has a cement floor and springs along both sides, 
on the outside, supporting and guiding it. For the case of an unsuppressed explosion, the tunnel is able to 
lift up to 140 mm off its base to provide an alternative escape route for the expanding gases. For the 
full-face conditions, the cross-sectional area was approximately 21 m
2
. Later, after the full-face tests had 
been completed, a shoulder was built into the left front of the test tunnel to simulate the out-shoulder 
conditions. A 4 m-long shoulder was built into the right-hand front corner of the tunnel to simulate the 
two-cut scenario where the machine was mining next to the shoulder. 
 
In accordance with the protocol (Du Plessis, 1998), the test sequence was carried out in order of 
ascending difficulty. Three main placements of the machine inside the tunnel were tested, as well as 
sub-conditions for the placements of the boom (and thus ignition) for these machine positions, and, of 
course, the various methane concentrations. The testing began with the 9% methane/air explosion for 
full-face conditions (see Table 2). This was successful, with no flame being detected along the right-hand 
wall of the tunnel (the operator’s cab position is on the right-hand side of the machine). Some flame was, 
however, detected at the roof and along the left-hand wall of the tunnel. 
 
The pressure rises caused by the explosion were so small that they were almost zero. For these tests, 
the highest temperature rise at the operator’s position was approximately 93 
o
C. The operator and the 
rest of the crew working at the face would be safe under the worst possible conditions. 
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Once the full-face tests were complete, a 4-m shoulder was put in place against the front right-hand wall 
of the tunnel, simulating the second cut. The machine was moved in adjacent to this wall for the 
in-shoulder tests. The results of these tests are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 2 - Full-face active suppression test results 
 
Test CH4/air (%) Flame length (m) Temp. increase (°C)  
77 9.0 6 80 
78 9.0 6 NR* 
79 9.0 6 93 
80 9.0 6 70 
81 9.0 6 NR* 
82 12.0 5 58 
 * NR = no temperature rise 
 
Table 3 - In-shoulder active suppression test results 
 
Test CH4/air (%) Flame length (m) Temp. increase (°C)  
92 9.0 6 33 
93 9.0 3 33 
94 9,0 4 33 
95 9.0 5 33 
96 12.0 5 33 
97 9.0 5 33 
 
For the in-shoulder testing, all tests complied with the protocol, with the system successfully suppressing 
all the explosions for the different ignition (and machine-boom) positions. For this series of tests, the 
highest temperature rise measured at the operator’s cab was approximately 33 
o
C, and once again the 
pressure sensors detected almost no pressure variations due to the explosion. In none of the cases was 
any flame detected at the operator’s cab position. 
 
For the final series of tests, the machine was pulled out from next to the shoulder, and the boom moved 
to simulate cutting the shoulder. The results of these tests are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 - Out-shoulder active suppression test results 
 
Test CH4/air (%) Flame length (m) Temp. increase (°C) 
85 9.0 8 100 
86 9.0 7 96 
87 9.0 8 100 
88 12.0 8 81 
89 9.0 8 98 
90 12.0 8 32 
91 7.5 6 32 
 
The tests were completed uneventfully for all the given positions and different concentrations for the 
out-shoulder machine conditions. The maximum length of the flame extension was 8 m (the operator’s 
position was now at 9 m for the out-shoulder tests). Once again, the pressure sensors detected almost 
no pressure changes.  
 
The system proved itself to be effective in detecting and suppressing explosions when configured and 
mounted on a Joy 12HM9 model for a cross-section with an area of approximately 21 m
2
. To test the 
system for South African medium-seam mining conditions, a second mining cut was simulated, resulting 
in a potential increase in the explosive volume of methane. The ExploSpot system complied effectively 
with all the requirements of the test protocol. 
 
200 m test tunnel: Facility for testing roadway barriers 
 
The 200-m test tunnel was used to conduct various tests. A comprehensive description of the tunnel was 
given by Cook (1993). The test tunnel was instrumented with flame sensors and a data acquisition 
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system for the evaluation. The tests were conducted with and without coal dust present. The different 
baseline explosions were: 
 
 Baseline 1: 75 ± 1 m
3
 methane/air mixture without coal dust 
 Baseline 2: 75 ± 1 m
3
 methane/air mixture with coal dust 
 
For the ExploSpot system evaluation in the 200 m test tunnel both explosions were used to evaluate the 
performance of the system. For the Baseline 2 explosion, coal dust is distributed on the floor and 
shelves of the tunnel (for 60 m after the membrane position). This results in a methane-initiated coal 
dust explosion. The test sequence included the placement of the HS Design Suppression System at the 
following positions within the 200-m test tunnel: 
 
 some 5 m from the closed end, i.e. within the methane chamber 
 some 7 m from the closed end, i.e. within the methane chamber 
 some 12 m from the closed end, i.e. within the methane chamber 
 
The purpose of the tests was to attempt to simulate explosion scenarios and to relate the results 
obtained in the test tunnel to those likely to be obtained in a mine. The Measure of success was defined 
to indicate whether the flame propagation was: 
 
 stopped inside the barrier (referred to as "stopped inside" in tables) 
 stopped at the barrier (referred to as “stopped on the spot”) 
 "stopped". 
 
An explosion is considered to have been "stopped on the spot" if the flame does not exceed a distance 
of 30 m beyond the end position of the barrier. Furthermore, the barrier is considered to have "stopped" 
an explosion if the flame propagation (i.e. flame distance) is less than what it would have been without a 
barrier installed.  
 
Test 2 was the baseline test in which no suppression system was placed in the tunnel. In this test the 
methane explosion propagated beyond the 71-m sensor position with an average calculated flame 
speed of 216 m/s at the 41-m sensor position, reaching a maximum calculated flame speed of 249 m/s. 
Figure 5 shows the flame speeds for the baseline methane explosion and for the tests with the active 




Figure 5 - Test 2 (baseline) flame and performance of the active barrier 
 
The active barrier successfully suppressed the propagating methane flames approaching the barrier at 
flame speeds varying from 13.4 m/s during test 3 to 53.2 m/s during test 4. In test 5 the flame stop 
position was at 21 m and only in this test did the flame progress beyond the barrier position, although the 
flame is still considered to have been “stopped on the spot”. 
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Tests 1 and 7 were baseline explosion tests with coal dust placed outbye of the methane chamber. In 
these tests no suppression system was placed in the tunnel; they were done to determine flame 
propagation speeds and maximum flame travel. In these tests the coal dust explosion flames 
propagated beyond the final sensor positions at 81 m and reached maximum speeds of between 306.8 
and 366.3 m/s at the 41 m sensor position.  
 
In the tests with a single suppression system installed at 5 and 7 m and a double system at 7 and 12 m 
respectively, it was clear that the methane ignition was inhibited to such an extent that no coal dust 
participated outbye of the barrier position.  
 
The average flame speed for the baseline and for the flame inhibition by the active barrier system when 




Figure 6 - Tests 8, 9, 10 and 7 average (baseline) flame speed and active barrier performance 
 
In all the tests the system was successful in suppressing flame propagation. In each case the 
performance of the system can be classified as “stopped on the spot”, i.e. the flame was stopped at the 
position at which the system was placed. The active barrier successfully suppressed propagating coal 
dust flames approaching the barrier at flame speeds varying from 24.4 to 62.2 m/s. 
 
In the unsuppressed explosion, the flame front reaches a distance of 180 m within 750 milliseconds, 
while the flame front, with the system installed at 30 m from the end of the tunnel, does not reach 50 m. 
 
The test results in the 200-m Kloppersbos tunnel were extrapolated to design the active suppression 
protection system for longwall mining. The 200-m tunnel provides a means of conducting large-scale 
evaluations and assessments of barrier performance and other requirements that cannot be done 
economically by other means. 
DEPLOYMENT OF SYSTEMS 
A total of 17 machine-mounted systems have been deployed in South Africa at Sasol mines and Anglo 
Thermal Coal operations. The system has successfully suppressed methane gas ignitions on five 
separate occasions. 
 
In China more than 400 systems have been deployed. The system is utilised within longwall operations 
to protect against ignitions associated with shearer frictional events. It is also deployed as a roadway 
barrier within 30 m of the tailgate position. Recent legislative changes in China have resulted in it being 
made mandatory to install ExploSpot systems on roadheaders and to install roadway barriers in all 
returns in Shanxi Province and Liaoning Province. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In protecting a mine against methane and/or coal dust explosions many different controls are 
implemented. However, many of these controls remain under the control of man. In this context the use 
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of active barrier systems can assist mine management in the prevention and control of the risk 
associated with mine explosions.  
 
The results obtained in the 10 m, 20-m and 200-m test tunnels at Kloppersbos still need to be 
considered in terms of the constraints of the different tunnels and different evaluation protocols. 
Nevertheless, from the tests conducted it can be concluded that the ExploSpot system was successful in 
stopping methane explosions and the associated flame propagation when ammonium phosphate 
powder was used as the suppression material.  
 
In all the tests conducted, both methane explosions and methane and coal dust hybrid explosions, the 
ExploSpot system stopped the flame spread, thus successfully preventing coal dust from participating in 
the methane ignition. 
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